Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35592 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4214
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
In recent years, a number of governments and consumer groups in rich countries have tried to discourage the use of child labor in poor countries through measures such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards. The purported objective of such measures is to reduce the incidence of child labor in developing countries and thereby improve children's welfare. In this paper, we examine the effects of such policies from a political-economy perspective. We show that these types of international action on child labor tend to lower domestic political support within developing countries for banning child labor. Hence, international labor standards and product boycotts may delay the ultimate eradication of child labor.
Subjects: 
Child labor
political economy
international labor standards
trade sanctions
JEL: 
J20
J88
O10
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
276.88 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.