Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35529 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4285
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
People use information about their ability to choose tasks. If more challenging tasks provide more accurate information about ability, people who care about and who are risk averse over their perception of their own ability will choose tasks that are not sufficiently challenging. Overestimation of ability raises utility by deluding people into believing that they are more able than they are in fact. Moderate overestimation of ability and overestimation of the precision of initial information leads people to choose tasks that raise expected output, however extreme overconfidence leads people to undertake tasks that are excessively challenging. Consistent with our results, psychologists have found that moderate overconfidence is both pervasive and advantageous and that people maintain such beliefs by underweighting new information about their ability.
Schlagwörter: 
Overconfidence
behavioral economics
information processing
JEL: 
D03
D08
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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