Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/34034 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 2649
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We study the impact of the Austrian Employment Act for the Disabled which grants extended employment protection, requires a hiring quota for firms, and subsidizes the employment of severely disabled (SD) workers. Using a large sample of eligible individuals we compare workers before and after acquiring legal SD-status. Unsurprisingly, we find that holding SD-status is associated with lower employment and earnings. However, workers holding a job when acquiring legal SD-status have substantially better subsequent employment prospects after SD-award than before. In contrast, workers who do not hold a job at the date of SD-entry do dramatically worse after SD-award than before. This suggests that employment protection legislation places substantial firing costs on firms and has a major impact on the decisions of firms to hire disabled workers
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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