Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330113 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 6 [Article No.:] 44 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-9
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.
Subjects: 
social choice functions
weak preferences
weak manipulability
veto rule
serial dictator
JEL: 
D71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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