Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330051 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 5 [Article No.:] 58 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1-19
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We consider a game-theoretic model of undocumented immigration with the aim of emphasizing the strategic interaction between the different forces affecting the issue. Specifically, we analyze the strategic interaction between firms in the destination country, native labor, the elected officials in the destination country, and the undocumented immigrants from the Source Country. We show that the impact of border enforcement is dampened because strategic interaction between the players will tend to mute any unilateral changes. We also study the effect of uncertainty in the labor market on migration issues and analyze the two cases where policymakers have to make their decisions before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the market state is realized.
Subjects: 
game theory
choice under uncertainty
undocumented immigration
labor economics
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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