Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330048 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 4 [Article No.:] 55 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1-9
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We investigate the impact of observability of contracts between a plaintiff and his attorney on both the efficiency of the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome from the environmental conflict. By including two specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts; however, (ii) the unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome in terms of the plaintiff's probability of winning the contest.
Subjects: 
asymmetric reimbursement
contingent fee
inefficiency
fairness
Tullock-type contests
unobservable and observable contracts
JEL: 
D72
K41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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