Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/327683 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12073
Publisher: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows a firm to be collusive when facing members of its cartel yet competitive when facing others. Intuitively, as initial bids are shaded, close initial bids not only imply similar costs but also provide an incentive to undercut. We detect firm pairs that ignore this incentive when facing each other. Our algorithm predicts Ukraine's Antimonopoly Committee's sanctions: firm pairs classified as collusive are 8.98 times more likely (standard error 2.65 times) to be sanctioned. It also uncovers additional collusion: 1,857 collusive firms participate in 15.57% of auctions, increasing costs by 1.95%.
Subjects: 
public procurement
collusion
online markets
JEL: 
H57
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.