Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32571 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2009,060
Publisher: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Abstract: 
The notion of choice inconsistency is widely spread in the literature on behavioral economics. Several approaches were used to account for the observation that people reverse their choices over time. This paper aims to explain the formation of resolutions regarded as internal self-binding devices. It moves away from anthropocentric neoclassicism and embraces a more atomistic notion of a player by defining intrapersonal agents as strategic actors. The magnitude of state-dependency is seen as a key driver of intrapersonal conflict modelled by the incongruity of the preferences of two opposing agents. The sequential conceptualisation basically allows for experimental testing
Subjects: 
Multiple Selves
Agency
Intrapersonal Conflict
Resolutions
Self-Binding
Self-Control
Commitment
JEL: 
C72
D01
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
470.44 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.