Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324982 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11991
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a principal's payoff guarantee against her competitors' threats. Second, they can support equilibrium outcomes and payoffs that cannot be supported with standard mechanisms. These results call for a novel approach to competing mechanisms, which we develop to identify a canonical game and a canonical class of equilibria, thereby establishing a new revelation principle for this class of environments.
Subjects: 
incomplete information
competing mechanisms
private disclosures
revelation principle
JEL: 
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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