Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323196 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Game Theory [ISSN:] 1432-1270 [Volume:] 54 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 19 [Publisher:] Springer Berlin Heidelberg [Place:] Berlin/Heidelberg [Year:] 2025
Publisher: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin/Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Abstract Game-theoretic analyses of communication rely on beliefs—especially, the receiver’s belief about the truth status of an utterance and the sender’s belief about the reaction to the utterance—but research that provides measurements of such beliefs is still in its infancy. Our experiment examines the use of second-order beliefs, measuring belief hierarchies regarding a message that may be a lie. In a two-player communication game between a sender and a receiver, the sender knows the state of the world and has a transparent incentive to deceive the receiver. The receiver chooses a binary reaction. For a wide set of non-equilibrium beliefs, the reaction and the receiver’s second-order belief should dissonate: she should follow the sender’s statement if and only if she believes that the sender believes that she does not follow the statement. The opposite is true empirically, constituting a new pattern of inconsistency between actions and beliefs.
Subjects: 
Strategic information transmission
Lying
Higher-order beliefs
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Additional Information: 
D01;D83
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version
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