Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320286 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 20 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 255-301
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents who have to be assigned items at each date. When the social planner can only elicit ordinal agents' preferences, we prove that under a mild regularity assumption, incentive compatible and ordinally efficient allocation rules coincide with spot mechanisms. The latter specify "virtual prices" for items at each date and, for each agent, randomly select a budget of virtual money at the beginning of time. When the social planner can elicit cardinal preferences, we prove that under a similar regularity assumption, incentive compatible and Pareto efficient mechanisms coincide with spot menu of random budgets mechanisms. These are similar to spot mechanisms except that, at the beginning of time, each agent chooses within a menu, a distribution over budget of virtual money.
Subjects: 
course allocation
dynamic matching
Market design
JEL: 
C61
C78
D47
D61
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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