Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319615 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
KIT Working Paper Series in Economics No. 166
Publisher: 
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON), Karlsruhe
Abstract: 
Deliberative decision-making is often proposed as a mechanism to mitigate polarization in democratic processes. However, empirical evidence remains mixed, with some studies suggesting that deliberation among like-minded individuals can drive preference shifts toward extremes. We use a three-round group dictator game to systematically examine how group composition influences deliberative outcomes. Our design allows us to compare deliberation within like-minded and mixed-minded groups while also manipulating the voting rule (median vs. unanimity) to assess its impact on decision-making. Contrary to expectations of polarization, we find that deliberation moderates preferences across all conditions. This effect is strongest for selfish participants in mixed-minded groups, but also like-minded selfish groups behave significantly less extreme than individuals. On the other hand, the moderating effect of deliberation does not persist when subjects revert back to individual decision-making. Regardless of the voting rule, groups tend to converge on unanimous decisions, suggesting norm-driven behavior in deliberative and participatory settings. Our findings contribute to ongoing debates on the role of group composition and decision rules in shaping collective outcomes in social dilemmas.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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