Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319301 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Regulation & Governance [ISSN:] 1748-5991 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd [Place:] Melbourne [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 146-160
Publisher: 
John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd, Melbourne
Abstract: 
Abstract Making security has been Leviathan's home turf and its prime responsibility. Yet, while security states in advanced democracies share this uniform purpose, there is vast variation in how they legitimize and how they make security policies. First, the political authority of elected policy‐makers is sometimes superseded by the epistemic authority of experts. Second, states make security, in some instances, by drawing on their own capacities, whereas in other fields they rely on rules to manage non‐state actors. Based on this variation in authority foundations and policy instruments, we disentangle Leviathan into different types of (i) positive, (ii) managing, (iii) technocratic, and (iv) regulatory security states. Our typology helps better understand contemporary security policy‐making; it advances regulatory governance theory by conceptualizing the relationship between expertise and rules in a complex and contested issue area; and it provides insights into the “new economic security state” and the domestic underpinnings of weaponized interdependence.
Subjects: 
authority
expertise
rules
security
state
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version
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