Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316850 
Title: 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11736
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
GoBs are goods for which agents have non-monotonic preferences: more is beneficial only up to an ideal level, beyond which additional quantities become undesirable. We analyze public GoBs (non-excludable and non-rival) through a theoretical framework applicable to diverse contexts such as solar geoengineering, wildlife management, and defense spending of European countries. The private provision of public GoBs proves inefficient due to both free-rider and free-driver externalities. Contribution costs and heterogeneity in ideal levels determine equilibrium outcomes. Surprisingly, reducing contribution costs can decrease welfare when agents' preferences diverge significantly.
Subjects: 
private provision of public goods
GoBs
heterogeneity
externalities
free-riding
free-driving
JEL: 
D01
D62
H23
H41
Q54
Q59
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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