Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31198 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1422
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this information is eventually revealed and the seller extracts es-sentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players.payoþs tend to zero as the discount factor tends to one. However, the uninformed bidder does relatively better than the informed bidder. We discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information, and argue that, under a Markovian re.nement, the outcome is pooling: information is revealed only insofar as it does not aþect prices. Bidders submit a common, low bid in the tradition of .collusion without conspiracy.
Schlagwörter: 
repeated game with incomplete information
private information
ratchet effect
first-price auction
dynamic auctions
JEL: 
C72
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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