Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31166 
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1397
Publisher: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Abstract: 
This paper highlights connections between the discrete and continuous approaches to optimal auction design with single and multi-dimensional types. We provide an interpretaion of an optimal auction design problem in terms of a linear program that is an instance of a parametric shortest path problem on a lattice. We also solve some cases explicitly in the discrete framework.
Subjects: 
Auctions
Networks
Linear Programming
JEL: 
C61
C70
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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