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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2937
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We discuss the literatures on behavioral economics, bounded rationality and experimental economics as they apply to firm behaviour in markets. Topics discussed include the impact of imitative and satisficing behavior by firms, outcomes when managers care about their position relative to peers, the benefits of employing managers whose objective diverges from profit-maximization (including managers who are overconfident or base pricing decisions on sunk costs), the impact of social preferences on the ability to collude, and the incentive for profit-maximizing firms to mimic irrational behavior.
Schlagwörter: 
behavioral economics, firms, oligopoly, bounded rationality, collusion
JEL: 
D40
L20
L21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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