Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/289574 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 288
Publisher: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Abstract: 
Auction models are convenient abstractions of informal price-formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. These processes involve frictions such as bidder recruitment costs for sellers, participation costs for bidders, and limitations on sellersícommitment abilities. This paper develops an auction model that captures such frictions. We derive several novel predictions; in particular, we Önd that outcomes are often ineffi cient, and the market sometimes unravels.
Subjects: 
Auctions
JEL: 
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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