Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288735 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Environmental Economics and Policy Studies [ISSN:] 1867-383X [Volume:] 23 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer Japan [Place:] Tokyo [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 309-331
Publisher: 
Springer Japan, Tokyo
Abstract: 
We have collected data from a world-wide survey among COP delegates to empirically investigate preferences for certain burden sharing rules among key groups in a setting that reflects the possibility of observing concessions from negotiating partners. In our survey, the participants had the opportunity to select and combine up to eight (pre-defined) burden sharing rules and to assign relative weights to the selected rules in their preferred bundle. We examine whether such a mechanism helps to overcome the currently strictly (self-interested) strategic claims on equity in the negotiation process. We observe that delegates from different groups of countries show a general willingness for concessions. However, the degree to which different burden sharing rules are taken into consideration partly differs between countries. As a key insight we report that the individual assessment of the polluter-pays rule based on current emissions does not only stress the persistence of the traditional Annex-B/Non-Annex-B division but also suggests tendencies for a more fragmented grouping with different positions between, for example, delegates from developing countries (i.e. G77 members) and emerging countries (i.e. BASIC). At the same time, we observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.
Subjects: 
International climate negotiations
Distributive justice
Equity preferences
Burden sharing rules
JEL: 
D63
H41
Q54
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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