Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288061 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economics & Politics [ISSN:] 1468-0343 [Volume:] 35 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1099-1121
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
This paper develops a dynamic population game in which agents play a simple anonymous‐exchange game of cooperating or defecting. Agents switch to the strategy with a higher expected payoff. Reformers can affect the payoff structure of the stage game to maximize the number of cooperators in the population by either enacting legal reform (institutional quality of contract law) or focusing on the macro outlook of the economy. Based on the theoretical model, the paper predicts which types the reformer should enact first and under which conditions reform will not be successful.
Subjects: 
macroeconomic political economy
microfoundations of political economy
property rights
reform/stabilization
social choice
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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