Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288030 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Regulation & Governance [ISSN:] 1748-5991 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd [Place:] Melbourne [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 328-345
Publisher: 
John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd, Melbourne
Abstract: 
As efforts to harmonize policies globally intensify, developing countries increasingly face pressures to adopt international standards. Yet, we know little about the circumstances under which developing countries manage to circumvent such pressures, or about their strategies to maintain policy space. We explore under which conditions developing countries are willing and able to sustain mock‐compliance, a situation where countries comply on paper but not in practice. Using country comparisons of Angola's, Nigeria's, Tanzania's, and Vietnam's engagement with the Basel banking standards, we show how three factors combine to produce sustained mock‐compliance: high costs of outright non‐compliance due to outward‐orientated banking sectors; high political costs of substantive compliance; and state control over profitable markets. Our article contributes to theory‐building in the literature on compliance and structural power as well as to broader debates about developing countries' policy autonomy in their engagement with global financial norms.
Subjects: 
developing countries
financial regulation
policy space
regulatory compliance
structural power
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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