Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287494 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Public Choice [ISSN:] 1573-7101 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-28
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
Constitutional democracy is in decline and many would-be autocrats try to transgress constitutional constraints. Here, we introduce the concept of militant constitutionalism, which suggests a number of constitutional rules that could make constitutions more resilient to attempts to undermine them. A first empirical evaluation, however, can link only few constitutional paths to enhanced constitutional resilience.
Subjects: 
Constitutional compliance
De jure-de facto gap
Democratic backsliding
Militant constitutionalism
Militant democracy
JEL: 
D73
H11
K16
K38
K42
P51
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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