Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287478 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Financial Services Research [ISSN:] 1573-0735 [Volume:] 61 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 167-185
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, I analyze the effectiveness of different capital regulations in mitigating the effects of moral hazard that exists only for systemically important banks. Leverage restrictions have the potential to reduce the fraction of banks that are systemically important but do not mitigate moral hazard for those that are. Risk adjusted requirements could mitigate moral hazard (of banks with low leverage) but do not affect (endogenous) systemic risk. A combination of both requirements as proposed by the Basel III framework can be successful, although only under restrictive conditions.
Schlagwörter: 
Capital regulation
Moral hazard
Leverage
JEL: 
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.