Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287418 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Review of Industrial Organization [ISSN:] 1573-7160 [Volume:] 59 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-12
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency's incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.
Subjects: 
Merger remedies
Merger control
Antitrust
JEL: 
L13
L40
K21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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