Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287053 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Business Economics [ISSN:] 1861-8928 [Volume:] 91 [Issue:] 7 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 935-964
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
We experimentally analyze three anti-tax-evasion mechanisms: (1) prefilling of deductions in tax returns, (2) restricting tax evasion opportunities by either disallowing or (3) limiting the deductibility of expenditures. We find that prefilling compared to blank forms reduces tax evasion. Cutting the number of tax evasion opportunities by disallowing the deductibility of expenditure items is an ineffective mechanism to combat tax evasion as individuals shift their tax evasion activities from the disallowed item to other non-restricted items. In contrast, our results suggest that just limiting the deductibility of expenditures avoids this evasion-shift-effect.
Subjects: 
Tax compliance
Tax evasion
Deductions
Prefilled tax returns
Behavioral economics
JEL: 
C91
D90
H26
K42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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