Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287051 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Dynamic Games and Applications [ISSN:] 2153-0793 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 343-362
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about the distribution of agents' types in the population. The resulting nonlinear dynamic system is studied. Convergence to a uniform belief depends on the relative size of the bias in beliefs.
Schlagwörter: 
Evolutionary game theory
Imitation equilibrium
Heterogeneous beliefs
Adverse selection
Cobweb model
JEL: 
C61
C73
D82
D83
E32
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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