Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/285065 
Title (translated): 
Tolerancia al incumplimiento: ¿discreción en lugar de reglas simples?
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 46 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 31-59
Publisher: 
Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía, Santiago de Chile
Abstract: 
We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain 'flexibility'. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may be more 'flexible'. We embed this dilemma in a political model and show that citizens will not support strong enforcement institutions unless the state is able to commit to sufficiently sophisticated redistributive policies.
Subjects: 
Discretion
commitment
simple rules
informality
enforcement
JEL: 
D71
D81
E26
O17
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-sa Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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