Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284066 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. WP 2023-25
Publisher: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, IL
Abstract: 
Galí (2014) showed that a monetary policy rule that raises interest rates in response to bubbles can paradoxically lead to larger bubbles. This comment shows that a central bank that wants to dampen bubbles can always do so by raising interest rates aggressively enough. This result is different from the Miao, Shen and Wang (2019) comment on Galí's paper. They argue Galí's model contains additional equilibria in which more aggressive rules dampen bubbles. We show that for these equilibria, more aggressive rules involve threats to raise interest rates more than actual rate increases.
Subjects: 
bubbles
monetary policy
interest rate rules
lean versus clean
General Aggregative Models: Neoclassical
Business Fluctuations
Cycles
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Monetary Policy
Asset Pricing
Trading Volume
Bond Interest Rates
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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