Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283241 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 2071
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Our article investigates the impact of vertical integration (without foreclosure) on innovation. We compare cases where either (i) two manufacturers or (ii) a manufacturer and a vertically integrated retailer invest. Then, the independent manufacturer(s) and the retailer bargain over non-linear contracts before selling to consumers. We show that vertical integration always increases the incentives to invest on the integrated product which stifles (resp. spurs) the investment of the independent manufacturer when spillovers are low (resp. high). In contrast, when investments are sequential, if the buyer power is high, the leader independent manufacturer invests more (resp. less) to discourage the integrated retailer's investment when spillovers are low (resp. high). Furthermore, vertical integration is always profitable even when it is not desirable for the industry and welfare. Overall, vertical integration is only desirable for the industry when the buyer power is high and may damage welfare when both the buyer power and spillovers are low.
Schlagwörter: 
Vertical integration
Investment
Buyer power
Spillovers
JEL: 
L13
L14
L42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
908.08 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.