Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283198 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 355
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the value of and the demand for instrumentally-valuable information in a simple decision environment where signals are transparently polarized. We find that in both information aggregation and acquisition, subjects use sophisticated heuristics to counter the polarization in signals. Even though the number of precise Bayesian reports are small, most subjects (64%) generate unpolarized reports even when faced with polarized signals. Subjects placed in a market place of information rarely end up buying polarized signals and instead overwhelmingly opt for diverse information. The demand for diverse information increases as diverse information becomes more valuable and decreases as it becomes more expensive.
Schlagwörter: 
Experimental economics
information acquisition
information aggregation
JEL: 
D90
D91
D81
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.12 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.