Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282875 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2023-062/I
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
Information about the consequences of our consumption choices can be unwelcome, and people sometimes avoid it. We investigate a situation where one person possesses information that is inconvenient for another, and study why and when they decide to transmit that information. We introduce a simple and portable experimental game to analyze transmission of inconvenient information. In this game, a Sender can inform a Receiver at a small cost about a negative externality associated with a tempting and profitable action for the Receiver. The results from our online experiment (N = 1,512) show that Senders transmit more information for large negative externalities. Sender's decisions are largely driven by their own preferences for information. However, some Senders take the Receiver's feelings into account, by transmitting evidence of positive externalities or by suppressing negative information upon the Receiver's request. Understanding the decision to share inconvenient information matters, as it will affect the personal and political will to address important externalities and can inform strategies to encourage the transmission of inconvenient information within organizations.
Subjects: 
willful ignorance
information avoidance
unethical behavior
lab experiment
JEL: 
B41
C91
C93
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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