Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282597 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16470
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the retirement patterns of married couples in Belgium. To forecast retirement behavior, we use administrative Social Security data from 2003 to 2017 and a discrete choice random utility model. In particular, we concentrate on the spousal bonus of pension payments to comprehend how financial incentives resulting from the social security system's structural design affect both partners' retirement decisions. We simulate the effect of the elimination of the spousal bonus and find that a small portion of women delay their retirement whereas the rest substitute into alternative social security benefits. Our results do not only highlight the significance of cross-program spillovers between various Social Security benefits, but also the heterogeneity in preferences for retirement and asymmetry of retirement behavior between husbands and wives.
Subjects: 
old-age labor supply
retirement incentives
spousal bonus
pension reforms
JEL: 
D10
H55
J26
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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