Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282157 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 466
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust across different samples and does not depend on psychological measures of reactance.
Subjects: 
cheating
lying
truth-telling
compliance
commitment
no-cheating rule
no-cheating declaration
commitment request
JEL: 
C91
C93
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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