Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279549 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 23-038
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
In a lab experiment, we analyze the benefits of increasing competition on auction platforms hosting multiple auctioneers of a homogeneous good. We find that increasing competition by merging separated individual auctions increases market efficiency and also buyers' payoffs, while there is no evidence of an increase in the auctioneers' expected revenues. Furthermore, competing auctioneers decrease reserve prices significantly when the number of competitors increases. Then, auctioneers' revenues decrease whereas buyers' payoffs and efficiency are enhanced. Different to previous findings for the monopolistic seller case, competing auctioneers do not increase reserve prices significantly when the number of buyers increases. For our theoretical model, we provide closed-form equilibrium reserve-price functions of competing auctioneers.
Subjects: 
Competing auctions
merging markets
parallel auctions
reserve price
experiment
JEL: 
D44
D47
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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