Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278982 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16284
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Using field and laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that the complexity of incentive schemes and worker bounded rationality can affect effort provision, by shrouding attributes of the incentives. In our setting, complexity leads workers to over-provide effort relative to a fully rational benchmark, and improves efficiency. We identify contract features, and facets of worker cognitive ability, that matter for shrouding. We find that even relatively small degrees of shrouding can cause large shifts in behavior. Our results illustrate important implications of complexity for designing and regulating workplace incentive contracts.
Schlagwörter: 
complexity
bounded rationality
shrouded attribute
ratchet effect
dynamic incentives
field experiments
JEL: 
D8
D9
J2
J3
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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