Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278954 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16256
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We evaluate a comprehensive reform of Norwegian early retirement institutions in 2011 through the lens of a parsimonious random utility choice model. The reform radically changed work incentives and/or pension access-age for some (but not all) workers. We find that improved work incentives caused employment to rise considerably, at the expense of both early retirement and exits through disability insurance. Lower access-age to own pension funds caused a small increase in employment and a large drop in disability program participation. Properly designed pension reforms thus need to take the interplay between old age pension and disability insurance programs into account.
Schlagwörter: 
pension reform
disability insurance
program substitution
JEL: 
H55
J22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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