Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278855 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16157
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Research on the economics of beauty has persistently emphasized beauty premiums in the labor market but ignored its influence within existing marriages. We examine the physical appearance of the wives and its influence on several post-marriage family outcomes using a conceptual framework that is widely applicable. Based on two data sets from China, we find beautiful women have at least 0.43 fewer children than average- or plain-looking women when controlling for other factors. The negative effect remains robust controlling for wages and the possible endogeneity of beauty. In terms of mechanisms, the negative impact seems to operate by altering bargaining power within the family and the opportunity cost of having children, but not through the quantity-quality interaction of children. For other outcomes, wives' good looks reduce the probability of their taking care of or tutoring their children and increase the probability of parents or in-laws caring for children or performing household chores in urban areas.
Subjects: 
beauty
household bargaining power
number of children
intergenerational care
opportunity cost
JEL: 
J10
J13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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