Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278644 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 23-09
Publisher: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Abstract: 
We present a model of startup acquisitions, which may give rise to inefficient "talent hoarding." We develop a model with two competing firms that can acquire and integrate (or "acquihire") a startup operating in an orthogonal market. Such an acquihire improves the competitiveness of the acquiring firm. We show that even absent the classical competition effects, acquihires need not be benign but can be the result of oligopolistic behavior, leading to an inefficient allocation of talent. Further, we show that such talent hoarding may reduce consumer surplus and lead to more job volatility for acquihired employees.
Subjects: 
acquihire
talent hoarding
startup acquisition
competition
JEL: 
L41
G34
M13
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.