Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278505 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 230
Verlag: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the design of bailout regimes when investment is distorted by a toomany-to-fail problem. The first-best allocation equalizes benefits from more banks investing in high-return projects with endogenously higher systemic risk due to more banks failing simultaneously. A standard bailout policy cannot implement the firstbest, as bailouts cause herding by banks. However, a targeted bailout policy that assigns banks to separate bailout regimes eliminates herding and achieves the firstbest. When such a policy is not feasible, targeted bailouts can be implemented by decentralizing bailout decisions to independent regulators. Our results have various implications for the optimal allocation of regulatory powers, both at the international level and domestically.
Schlagwörter: 
systemic risk
too-many-to-fail
optimal investment
bailouts
JEL: 
G1
G2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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