Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/273737 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 405
Publisher: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Abstract: 
When affirmative action policies target more than one disadvantaged group, they contain uncertainty as to whether an individual who belongs to one of these groups was actually favored. In a laboratory experiment, we study how this feature affects outcomes of affirmative action in the form of quotas, and compare it with two other conditions, namely affirmative action with a certain favored group and no affirmative action. We find that when a group is favored with certainty and the social identity that triggers affirmative action is made salient, affirmed individuals are wrongly perceived as less competent, both by themselves and by others. Consequently, their willingness to compete does not increase and they are selected less for teamwork post competition. Affirmative action with uncertain favored groups does not distort belief in competence, and thus does not induce such unintended consequences. In contrast, it increases competition entry of the affirmed groups and enhances their chances of being selected for teamwork.
Subjects: 
Affirmative action
Competition
Uncertainty
Identity
Experiment
JEL: 
C91
D02
J71
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-404-6
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
891.92 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.