Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271919 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10275
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We develop a theory of conversations. Two agents with different interests take turns choosing the topic of the conversation. Talking about a single topic allows them to delve deeper, making the conversation more informative (or enjoyable). To capture this dynamic, we assume that the marginal utility from conversing increases when the agents stay on topic. The equilibrium conversation is extreme: it either maximizes or minimizes welfare. Long conversations are deep and thus efficient. Short ones are often superficial. The topic of a deep conversation depends in subtle ways on who speaks when. Applications range from echo chambers to team production.
Subjects: 
communication
information acquisition
team production
JEL: 
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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