Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271873 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10229
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper investigates how direct election regimes (à la presidential democracy) affect the selection of women into political offices compared to indirect appointment (à la parliamentary). Exploiting the staggered phase-in across Italian municipalities of a reform to the local institutional regime, I find that the introduction of direct elections increased the fraction of female mayors substantially. The results are stronger in cities with a high pre-reform share of female politicians and driven by high-quality female officials replacing undereducated incumbents. Taken together, the results of this paper inform that direct election regimes ease the selection of competent politicians into office.
Subjects: 
political selection
voting systems
gender gaps
female representation
JEL: 
C24
D02
D72
J16
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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