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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10122
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the reaction of Italian Members of Parliament to a rigorous fact-checking of their public statements. Our research design relies on a novel randomized field experiment in collaboration with the leading Italian fact-checking company. Our results show that politicians are responsive to negative fact-checking. Specifically, we observe a significative reduction in the number of incorrect statements made by politicians after being treated. This effect persists for at least two months. We also observe a reduction in the probability of politicians making verifiable statements, suggesting that fact-checking may also increase the ambiguity of politicians' statements.
Schlagwörter: 
fact-checking
politicians
accountability
verifiability
ambiguity
RCR
JEL: 
D72
D78
D80
D91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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