Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27155 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 14/2007
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifi- able performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties the pure threat of using the legal system may suffice to make the principal implement first-best effort. As is shown in the paper, this finding is rather robust. In particular, it holds for sit- uations where the agent is protected by limited liability, where the parties have different technologies in the litigation contest, or where the agent is risk averse.
Schlagwörter: 
double-sided moral hazard
efficiency wage
litigation contest
settlement
JEL: 
D86
J33
K41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
381.98 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.