Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271514 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 3/2023
Publisher: 
Bank of Finland, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT), Helsinki
Abstract: 
We analyze media repression in Putin's Russia (2004-2019), a smart dictatorship that mimics democratic institutions, notably relatively free elections, and a relatively free press. Drawing on a unique granular dataset on journalist harassment and the pre-determined, staggered timing of local elections, we find evidence of strong political cycles of media repression. This media repression ahead of elections leads to a more favorable tonality of the news coverage of incumbents. Free press and free elections are temporally decoupled, thus disallowing them to work as effective accountability mechanisms. This secures dictator's power while upholding an image of competence and democratic rule.
Subjects: 
Authoritarian government
smart dictatorships
media repression
political election cycles
media tonality
JEL: 
D72
H10
P43
ISBN: 
978-952-323-441-3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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