Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271265 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
QMS Research Paper No. 2022/10
Publisher: 
Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Management School, Belfast
Abstract: 
We study equilibria in an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging game, a cost minimization game inherent to decentralized charging control strategy for EV power demand management. In our model, each user optimizes its total cost which is sum of direct power cost and the indirect dissatisfaction cost. We show that, taking player specific price independent dissatisfaction cost into account, contrary to popular belief, herding only happens at lower EV uptake. Moreover, this is true for both linear and logistic dissatisfaction functions. We study the question of existence of price profiles to induce a desired equilibrium. We define two types of equilibria, distributed and non-distributed equilibria, and show that under logistic dissatisfaction, only non-distributed equilibria are possible by feasibly setting prices. In linear case, both type of equilibria are possible but price discrimination is necessary to induce distributed equilibria. Finally, we show that in the case of symmetric EV users, mediation cannot improve upon Nash equilibria.
Subjects: 
Electric Vehicles
Pricing
Nash equilibrium
Coarse correlated equilibrium
Mediation
Herding
Dissatisfaction cost
JEL: 
C61
C72
D4
D11
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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