Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271096 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
KIT Working Paper Series in Economics No. 160
Verlag: 
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON), Karlsruhe
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a voting model with partial information in which the evaluation of social welfare must be based on information about agents' top choices plus qualitative background conditions on preferences. The former is elicited individually, while the latter is not. The social evaluator is modeled as an imprecise Bayesian characterized by a set of priors over voters' complete ordinal preference profiles. We apply this 'frugal aggregation' model to multi-dimensional budget allocation problems and propose a solution concept of 'ex-ante' Condorcet winners. We show that if the social evaluator has symmetrically ignorant beliefs over profiles of quadratic preferences, the ex-ante Condorcet winners refine the set of Tukey medians (Tukey, 1975).
Schlagwörter: 
Social choice under partial information
participatory budgeting
frugal aggregation
ex-ante Condorcet approach
Tukey median
JEL: 
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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