Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26901 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNicklisch, Andreasen
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-13-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:31Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:31Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26901-
dc.description.abstractWe present the results of an experiment on learning with minimal information. Particularly, subjects are only provided with feedback about their own payoff from the last period of the game being played, but not with information about the structure of the game. We compare the empirical structure of the decision algorithm for this setting with the empirical structure of algorithms for subjects who receive sufficient information to learn the game. The laboratory data show that, depending on the information setting, players adjust their strategy choice differently. The structure of the decision algorithm for subjects operating with minimal information indicates myopic responses to success, while the structure for sufficiently informed players is more complex. As a consequence, sufficiently informed players outperform players who have minimal information in a simple coordination game. Yet, if the structure of the game changes, readjustment is more successful for the players operating with minimal information.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2006,17en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.jelD84en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExperimental economicsen
dc.subject.keywordlearningen
dc.subject.keywordminimal social situationen
dc.subject.keywordmyopiaen
dc.titlePerceiving strategic environments: an experimental study of learning under minimal information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn521158443en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
372.25 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.