Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268614 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Eastern European Economics [ISSN:] 1557-9298 [Volume:] 61 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Taylor & Francis [Place:] Abingdon [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 111-130
Publisher: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Abstract: 
This study examines whether Russian farmers who enter regional politics can skew local policies in their favor. We hypothesize that Russian regions with more local members of parliament (MPs) owning agricultural businesses and farmer-ministers are more likely to allocate higher agricultural subsidies. To test these hypotheses, we use a unique 2008–2015 panel dataset on agricultural subsidies in combination with qualitative data. We find that the pervasiveness of agricultural interest in local parliaments affects the size of agricultural subsidies. Regional agriculture ministers who own farms may play the role of “gatekeepers” to the subsidies.
Subjects: 
political connections
redistribution
agricultural subsdies
businesspeople-politicians
Russia
JEL: 
D72
H23
H25
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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