Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/266644 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 22-054
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior that is consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate non-standard choice behavior.
Subjects: 
Matching Theory
Market Design
Stability
College Admissions Market
JEL: 
C62
C78
D47
D9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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